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REVIEW ESSAY
Henry Clay and the Historian:
A One-Hundred-Year Perspective
b y J O H N M. B E L O H L A V E K

Henry Clay, Statesman for the Union. By Robert V. Remini. (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991. xxviii, 818 pp. Preface, chronology, genealogy, abbreviations, photographs, bibliographical essay, index. $35.00.)
Asked on his deathbed if he had any regrets of things that
he had not done in his life, Andrew Jackson replied, “Yes, I
didn’t shoot Henry Clay and I didn’t hang John C. Calhoun.”
Jackson viewed Clay as a “base, mean scoundrel,” while Clay
judged Old Hickory to be an ignorant, corrupt hypocrite. Although Clay attained an enviable list of public contributions during his lifetime, the enmity between him and Jackson often
serves as the focal point of the Kentuckian’s forty-year career.
Clay scholars have struggled for over 150 years to bring him out
of Jackson’s shadow and into the warm light of recognition of
his accomplishments as politician and diplomat.
As one of the most prominent men of the early republic and
a three-time presidential candidate, Clay has been the subject of
numerous adulatory biographies, including a predictable effort
by his grandson .1 Late nineteenth-century authors, troubled by
the greed and financial corruption of the Gilded Age, saluted
Clay’s sense of selfless public responsibility. Civil service reformer, editor, and politician Carl Schurz praised “Harry of the
West” in his two-volume biography, noting, “In no sense was he
John M. Belohlavek is professor of history, University of South Florida,
Tampa.
1.

George D. Prentice, Biography of Henry Clay (Hartford, 1831); Calvin Colton, The Life and Times of Henry Clay, 2 vols. (New York, 1846), and Colton,
The Last Seven Years of the Life of Henry Clay (New York, 1856); Nathan
Sargent, Life of Henry Clay (Philadelphia, 1844); Epes Sargent, The Life and
Public Services of Henry Clay Down to 1848 (New York, 1848); Thomas Hart
Clay, Henry Clay (Philadelphia, 1910).
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a money-maker in politics. His integrity as a public man remained without blemish throughout his long career.“2
Although several monographs in the early twentieth century
traced particular aspects of Clay’s service, he did not receive
serious biographical consideration again until the 1930s. In that
decade, studies by Bernard Mayo and George Poage but especially Glyndon Van Deusen, documented Clay’s place in American history.3 Generally sympathetic works marked Clay’s career
as nationalist champion of government promotion of the economy and patron saint of the Whig party. Most importantly, the
“Great Compromiser” and “Pacificator” guided the troubled
Union through a series of life-threatening crises. Satisfied with
Clay’s image, historians generally eschewed revisionist biography in favor of an examination of political party structure and
membership.4 It is subtle irony, of course, that Robert Remini,
the author of more than a half-dozen books on Jackson, has

2.

Carl Schurz, Life of Henry Clay, 2 vols. (Boston, 1887); Howard Caldwell,
Henry Clay: The Great Compromiser (Chicago, 1899); Joseph M. Rogers, The
True Henry Clay (Philadelphia, 1904).
3. Mary Follett, Henry Clay as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives
(Washington, DC, 1892); John Bassett Moore, Henry Clay and Pan
Americanism (New York, 1915). Bernard Mayo’s Henry Clay: Spokesman of
the New West (Boston, 1937), intended as part of a multi-volume biography,
ends with the War of 1812. George Poage, Henry Clay and the Whig Party
(Chapel Hill, 1936), focuses largely on politics. The best biographer of
Clay was Glyndon Van Deusen, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston, 1937). Over
400 pages, the book is well researched and written and, while sympathetic
to Clay, even handed in overall treatment. Claude Bowers, Party Battles of
the Jackson Period (Boston, 1922), a Democratic loyalist, renders an unusually negative view of Clay as a “political opportunist” (p. 174).
4. Clement Eaton’s Henry Clay and the Art of American Politics (Boston, 1957)
was not intended to be a comprehensive biography, but it is the best brief
study available. Studies such as Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumverate:
Webster, Clay and Calhoun (New York, 1987), intertwine the careers of
Jackson’s enemies brilliantly, and Marie-Luise Frings, Henry Clay’s American
System und die Sektionale Kontroverse in den Vereinigten Staaten Von Amerika,
1815-1829 (Frankfort, 1979), argues local not national motives prompted
Clay’s desire for the American System. Florida Whiggery was addressed in
the 1950s by Herbert J. Doherty, Jr., The Whigs of Florida, 1845-1854
(Gainesville, 1959), and in Doherty, Richard Keith Call: Southern Unionist
(Gainesville, 1961). In the post-war era, historians such as Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1945); John William Ward,
Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New York, 1955); Marvin Meyers, The
Jacksonian Persuasion (Stanford, 1957); and Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy (Princeton, 1961), moved the focus away from biography
to issues of class, psychological forces, and voter analysis.
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emerged as the first serious biographer of Clay since the Great
Depression.5
Readers familiar with Remini’s work know that his views are
more pro-Jackson than anti-Clay. Surprisingly, however, the author has a genuine respect and even affection for the Kentuckian. Philosophically, Remini shares Clay’s beliefs in an activist
role for government. Personally, he admires Clay’s class and
style, his sense for the dramatic and daring. Remini takes obvious delight— some may argue to the point of overkill— in extolling Clay’s virtues as an orator: “His style was . . . relaxed and
freewheeling, his movements always graceful, even when propelled by passion. When the Kentuckian spoke, listeners did not
have the sense that they were hearing an oration, yet they found
themselves utterly absorbed in his argument and fully persuaded by his logic and commanding language. His enthusiasm,
his total involvement in his cause, and his frequent majestic
flights of oratory mesmerized his audience” (p. 431).
Pausing at the appropriate moment to adjust his spectacles
or dip a pinch of snuff from his silver box, Clay appears unequaled as a debater. The combination of gifted mind, quick
wit, and sharp tongue devastated ill-armed opponents. Unfortunately, his insensitivity toward, and often humiliation of, those
who disagreed with him created enemies. For Clay the attacks
were political, rarely personal, and he generally tried to salve
the wound with a handshake and a glass of whiskey. Remini
speaks with fondness of Clay’s emotion and sentimentality, but
especially of his self-deprecating sense of humor and the ability
not to take himself too seriously— the latter qualities Jackson
certainly lacked.
Although a middle-class Virginian by birth (1777), Clay
moved to rough-and-tumble Kentucky at the age of twenty and
became a man of the frontier. He loved to drink, carouse, swear,
gamble, and tell stories— all qualities that endeared him to Wes:
terners of his era. When his wife Lucretia was asked if she objected to Clay’s cardplaying, she retored, “Heavens, no, he almost always wins!” These virtues later became vices. Critics at5.

Robert V. Remini’s works include The Election of Andrew Jackson (Philadelphia, 1963); Andrew Jackson (New York, 1966); Andrew Jackson and the Bank
War (New York, 1967); Andrew Jackson, 3 vols. (New York, 1977-1984); and
The Legacy of Andrew Jackson: Essays on Democracy, Indian Removal, and Slavery
(Baton Rouge, 1988).
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tacked Clay’s “lewd” lifestyle. Remini admits that Clay was a
“wretched father,” drank excessively, and was “quite possibly”
unfaithful to Lucretia. Yet the author contends that “Prince
Hal” generally remained in control of his habits and never let
them affect his work. Rumor and perception contributed to
Clay’s reputation for hard living.
Within a decade of arriving in Lexington, Kentucky, the
young barrister had achieved both prosperity and national political office. Comfortable in his beloved estate, “Ashland,” Clay
married into a good Kentucky family and surrounded himself
with slaves and horses. He aligned himself with the “aristocratic”
as opposed to the “democratic” elements after his election to
the state assembly in 1803. This bonding illustrated a nagging
flaw in Clay’s political character— a failure to identify with the
“populist” elements of the frontier. He perceived himself as a
“Madisonian Republican” and mistrusted the transformation of
American politics from the representative republicanism of the
Jeffersonian era to the emerging majoritarian democracy of the
Age of Jackson. Elected to the United States Senate in 1806,
Clay emerged as a leader of the nationalist “War Hawks” in
Congress. Decrying high seas violations by Great Britain, they
championed American expansion into British Canada and the
Spanish Floridas. Ever pragmatic, Clay’s nationalism evaporated, however, in opposition to the rechartering of the Bank
of the United States in 1811.
Eagerly switching to the House of Representatives, Clay
served as speaker for the next decade, seizing the opportunity
to reshape the office into an instrument of political power. In
the process, he displayed troublesome qualities that haunted
him throughout his congressional career. Colleagues branded
him “The Dictator,” and Remini notes that “his arrogance, his
overbearing conceit, his presumptuousness, eventually turned
men against him” (p. 84).
Although some historians more sympathetic with James
Madison might disagree, the War Hawks in Congress became
increasingly distraught over the “appalling failure of leadership” provided by the president (p. 87).6 Reluctantly pushed
6.

Madison’s major biographer, Irving Brandt, James Madison, The Fourth President (London, 1969), sees his subject as bold and aggressive, although Jack
Rakove, James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic (Glenview,
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towards hostilities in 1812, Madison proved to be an unimpressive wartime chief— Clay dubbed him “too benevolent.”
Nonetheless, the Kentuckian led the House in defense of the
administration until he departed for Europe as a member of the
peace mission in 1814. This eighteen-month sojourn provided
Clay with his only European travel and an opportunity to work
closely with John Quincy Adams. Although the delegation concluded a favorable treaty at Ghent, Belgium, in December 1814,
Remini excoriates Clay for his “inexcusable” and “childish” behavior during the negotiations and for playing the role of “carping critic” rather than constructive force. When he returned to
the United States in September 1815, Clay’s ego had grown
geometrically. Contemplating the presidency, he viewed the
State Department as a proper stepping stone and a place rightfully due him. He was consequently furious when James Monroe
offered the post of secretary of state to John Quincy Adams. In
an amazing display of pettiness, Clay sought to utilize his
speakership to cripple the new administration. Remini observes,
“Clay set out to replace the executive as the controlling arm in
the conduct of American foreign policy” (p. 155). Shifting his
pragmatism to domestic affairs, Clay experienced a rebirth of
economic nationalism. Based on the debacle of the War of 1812,
the Kentuckian embraced the need for a new national bank, a
tariff with selected, protective rates, and federally funded internal improvements. Later dubbed the “American System,” this
became the bedrock program with which Clay would live and
eventually, die.
During the years 1817 to 1825 Clay demonstrated that the
term “The Era of Good Feelings” was a national political misnomer. He unsuccessfully battled Monroe on internal improvements and Adams on foreign affairs. Adams proved to be one
of the most successful secretaries of state in American history,
scoring triumphs in negotiations with Great Britain, Russia, and

IL, 1990), views him as more thoughtful and deliberate. Most historians
join Remini in harsher criticism. Roger H. Brown, The Republic in Peril:
1812 (New York, 1963), notes, “He [Madison] was beyond his depth in
managing the affairs of an unruly, fractious, nineteenth century republic
as it moved towards war” (p. 189). Donald Hickey, The War of 1812: A
Forgotten Conflict (Urbana, IL, 1989), also criticizes Madison as “one of the
weakest war leaders in the nation’s history” (p. 301).
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Spain. The United States acquired Florida and laid down the
Monroe Doctrine.7
In a brilliant speech in January 1819, Clay bashed the administration for executive abuse of power in ordering an invasion
of Spanish Florida. He also, unfortunately, harshly criticized
Andrew Jackson for his conduct in leading that operation. A
House investigation exonerated Old Hickory, but Clay had committed a serious mistake. Jackson neither forgave nor forgot.
Even so, Clay enhanced his national reputation as a champion
of union and compromise through his role in promoting the
Missouri Compromise of 1819-1821. Remini laments, “He was
one of the most gifted men of his age. He distinguished himself
as a public speaker, a lawyer, a politician, and Speaker of the
House of Representatives. He might have made a truly great
President” (p. 209). This primary goal of Clay’s life— his driving
passion— would never be achieved.
Clay made his first serious attempt at the White House in
1824. While most Americans acknowledged his administrative
and political talents, leadership, and oratorical skills, increasing
doubt arose over his ambition and integrity. He could not escape
this duality. Many contemporaries feared that he “lusted” for
the presidency in an era when candidates were expected to
“stand” not “run” for the office. In 1887 Carl Schurz noted
Clay’s “chronic” ambition, suggesting that such zealousness was
“apt to unsettle the character, and darken the existence of those
afflicted with it by confusing their appreciation of all else” (p.
413). Schurz sadly observed that Clay would have been a happier and greater man if be had never coveted “the glittering
prize.” Remini contends that Clay likely had “a greater natural
force of mind than any of his contemporaries,” but he recklessly
squandered it in the pursuit of pleasure and ambition (p. 339).
He was “a savagely ambitious man,” and the passion for power
colored all that he did and took precedence over his personal
and family life (p. 687). No historian of “Harry of the West”
neglects to comment on this characteristic and its negative im7.

The success of Adams in outfoxing Clay in the timing and delineation of
American policy regarding Florida and Latin America is explained by William Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire (Lexington, KY,
1992). A similar view, but less-obviously Machiavellian, is presented in
Samuel F. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign
Policy (New York, 1949).
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pact upon his career. Clay’s reputation suffered dramatically in
the aftermath of his failed bid for the presidency in 1824. When
an electoral deadlock sent the names of John Quincy Adams,
Andrew Jackson, and William H. Crawford to the House of
Representatives in 1825 for resolution, Clay threw his support
behind his old nemesis from Massachusetts. Although he personally disliked Adams, Clay agreed with his nationalistic outlook and respected his abilities. Adams was elected on the first
ballot in early February, and a week later Clay accepted the post
of secretary of state. The “corrupt bargain” had been sealed.
Clay’s biographers have battled the charge since its inception. Calvin Colton, in a chapter entitled “The Great Conspiracy,” refers to the corrupt bargain charge as “one of the greatest atrocities in the moral history of mankind” (p. 287). Carl
Schurz calls the bargain issue “absurd” (p. 249). Joseph Rogers
presents greater balance by suggesting that “history has fully
justified the purity of Clay’s and Adams’s motives, but it has not
sustained them in their conduct, either from a political or practical point of view” (p. 137). The recent scholarship of Clement
Eaton emphasizes that “the most careful searching of the evidence has turned up nothing to incriminate Clay” (p. 56), and
Merrill Peterson agrees that Clay was “innocent of bargain and
corruption” (p. 130). Samuel Bemis concurs that an “implicit
bargain, a gentleman’s agreement” occurred, but “nothing corrupt.” Remini is probably closest to the mark. He denies that
any overt bargain ever took place; it was unnecessary. Both men
were intelligent enough to assume the obvious. Tragically, the
corrupt bargain charge haunted Clay for the remainder of his
career and, in Remini’s judgment, played the major role in keeping him from the White House.8
Clay served four joyless years in the State Department. He
focused upon the promotion of a dynamic policy with the newly
emerging Latin American republics. Remini views this as a
forerunner of the “Good Neighbor Policy” of the next century.
8.

Samuel F. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York, 1956), 13031. A frustrated Clay continually addressed the corrupt bargain charge
throughout his career, at one point publishing a thirty-page pamphlet in
rebuttal. Mary Hargreaves, The Presidency of John Quincy Adams (Lawrence,
KS, 1985) argues that Clay’s great betrayal was not supporting fellow Westerner Jackson, and his “corruption was the error of political misjudgment
in generalizing the trends of intrasectional change.”
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Including such elements as free trade, freedom of the seas, selfdetermination, and a transisthmian canal, the visionary policy
sank on the reef of a hostile Jacksonian Congress. Negotiations
with Mexico and Britain also failed, prompting Remini to give
the administration high marks for imagination and low marks
for achievement.
When Adams failed in his re-election bid against Andrew
Jackson in 1828, the field finally opened for Henry Clay. As the
new leader of the National Republican party, “Prince Hal” fully
expected that the popular American System would catapult him
into the executive mansion. Surely, the people would reject
Jackson, a “military chieftain” and petty tyrant who had abused
the presidential office through his veto of the Second Bank.
Once again, Clay erred. The people trusted the Old Hero and
re-elected him in 1832 by a solid margin.
Clay was promptly presented, however, with another opportunity to restore his reputation and save the union in 1833.
Tariff conflict had brought about nullification in South Carolina
and a contest of wills between the president and state officials.
Remini praises Clay’s patriotism in masterminding the compromise tariff, which alleviated the crisis. Here the Kentuckian
was at his best as national statesman.
For the remainder of the decade Clay played the role of
opposition leader in the Senate. Obsessed with the despotic excesses of “Jacksonism,” he tormented the administration at every
opportunity. Referring to the enemies of “King Andrew” as
Whigs, Clay sought to save the republic and bring this tyrannical
lunatic to heel. No doubt his most triumphant moment came
with the censure of the president by the Senate in March 1834
for violations of executive power.9
Although Clay and his compatriots functioned most effectively as critics, they could not mount a unified campaign in
1836 and select a candidate to oppose Jackson’s heir, Martin
9.

The philosophical underpinnings of the Democrat and Whig parties have
been examined most recently by Harry Watson, Liberty and Power (New
York, 1990), and Lawrence Kohl, The Politics of Individualism (New York,
1989). Also important for placing Clay in the context of Whig thought is
Daniel W. Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago, 1979).
Key for understanding the market forces at work in party definition is
Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New
York, 1991).
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Van Buren. Clay’s disillusionment peaked as he watched the
Jacksonians dismantle his economic programs, and he failed to
capture the Whig party’s nomination in either 1836 or 1840.
The contest in 1840 became particularly painful because a national financial collapse predicated a Whig victory. Clay campaigned for the nomination, but the negatives mounted. His
albatross— the corrupt bargain— continued to hang around his
neck; people suspected Clay’s integrity and questioned his “loose
morals.” He suffered a “popularity problem” with the masses,
as evidenced by two previous defeats. Continuing to rely on the
American System as his platform, Clay dismissed the increasingly controversial issue of slavery. Time and Providence would
cure all in Clay’s judgment. In lashing out at abolitionist “ultras”
Clay had cried, “I would rather be right than be president.”
Remini suggests he would rather be right and president. Despite
the patriotic resonance of such statements, the Whigs jumped
on the bandwagon of their own “military chieftain,” William
Henry Harrison, who was swept to victory in November.
Clay responded to “Old Tip’s” triumph with bittersweet arrogance. Clearly, the Kentuckian expected to dominate the administration and to resurrect his American System in Congress.
But Clay, domineering and demanding, did not gain the influence with his new chief as planned. When Harrison died one
month after taking office, Clay viewed the ascent of John Tyler
with relief. Once again branded a “dictator” by his Senate peers,
Clay rushed ahead on a collision course with the president. Remini criticizes Tyler for lacking “moral firmness” but indicts the
headstrong Kentuckian for almost single-handedly destroying
the Whig party in his obsession to recharter the Bank of the
United States. Although a number of significant Whig economic
gains were made, the struggle left the party exhausted and Tyler
and Clay bitter enemies.
Clay’s commitment to domestic affairs revealed a naiveté
about the evolving American concern for Texas and Oregon.
Although Clay desperately wanted the presidential nomination
in 1844, he failed to envision expansion as a key issue. A victim
of overconfidence and an abiding desire to set the national
agenda, he finally recognized the importance of Texas in the
spring of 1844; Clay’s views on the subject, published in a series
of letters in the summer, tried to divorce the heated topics of
slavery and annexation and created an air of indecisiveness
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about his position. Voters may have loved Henry Clay, but they
distrusted him. The letters doomed his candidacy, and he lost
to a “dark horse” Democrat, James K. Polk.
The Kentuckian spent the next four years attacking the
myopic economic policies of the Jacksonians and speaking out
against the Mexican War. Betrayed again by a party bent on
expediency, Clay lost the 1848 nomination to war hero Zachary
Taylor. A failure in leadership, however, allowed “the Star of
the West” one last chance to assert his talents in the Senate.
Legislation surrounding the fate of territories in the West acquired during the recent conflict once again paralyzed the government and threatened disunion. Into the breach stepped the
“Great Pacificator” to author and argue for the Compromise of
1850. Remini joins other Clay biographers in praising the Kentuckian as “the one person most responsible for the ultimate
solution of the crisis of 1850” (p. 761). Other historians disagree.
Holman Hamilton argues that Congressional Democrats, especially Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, should be given credit for
the compromise. E. B. Smith makes a more difficult argument
in advocating a leadership role for Zachary Taylor, who died in
July before the various segments of the legislation had passed.10
The year 1850 marked the passing of the political torch to
a new generation of American political leadership. Some historians have argued that the flickering flame of union burned out
with them. Calhoun had died in March 1850, Clay succumbed
to tuberculosis in the summer of 1852, while Webster followed
a few months later from complications of liver disease. These
were the men who ardently desired the presidency, yet none
reached the brass ring of executive office. Remini clarifies why
Clay never reached the White House. Simply put, he never understood the people. Americans loved and respected Clay’s talents and abilities but could not overcome their far-rearching
reservations about his persona: the aristocratic predelictions, ar-

10.

Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and Compromise of 1850
(Lexington, KY, 1964), E. B. Smith, The Presidencies of Zachary Taylor and
Millard Fillmore (Lawrence, KS, 1988). William Freehling, The Road to Disunion (New York, 1990), 507-08, is critical also of Clay and praises Douglas.
Recent Clay scholars have given other figures, particularly Douglas, credit
for the passage of the compromise but insist that Clay should receive
maximum credit for originating and arguing the Omnibus measure. See
Eaton, Henry Clay, 192-93, and Peterson, Great Triumverate, 474-75.
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rogance and conceit, consuming ambition, and tainted character. Perhaps Americans could never elect a man who used a
silver snuff box.
Sympathetic yet critical, this volume stands as the best work
on Clay ever written. Its preeminence arises, however, not from
interpretive innovation. In fact, it is striking how Clay’s biographers have generally recognized and agreed upon their subject’s strengths and failings. Instead, Remini’s effort excels
through its exhaustive research, narrative force, and detailed
description of over 800 pages. The press may possibly agree to
publish an abridgement, which would give the reader an opportunity to discover Clay without embracing the present edition’s
daunting size. It might also allow the overzealous author an
opportunity to winnow some of his very lengthy, descriptive
sentences. Sharper analysis in some instances would also have
been more helpful. For example, if Clay was as politically clever
and cunning as Remini suggests, why did he agree to accept the
appointment of secretary of state in an atmosphere so shrouded
in controversy, and why did he fail to recognize the rising tide
of slavery as a national issue? Minor issues aside, this tour-deforce on Henry Clay has simply reinforced Robert Remini’s position as one of the nation’s premier scholars in the field of
nineteenth-century political biography.
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